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*The Indian Trade of the Susquehanna Valley*


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THE INDIAN TRADE OF THE SUSQUEHANNA VALLEY

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Historians of the frontier agree that the fur trade manured the farthest outposts of Euro-American settlement, all the way across the continent. They generally agree also that Pennsylvania, in the early eighteenth century, became the gateway to the west. It would seem, then, that the Pennsylvania fur trade of the early eighteenth century should be an object of special concern. However, it appears in the histories as an embarrassing hiatus between numerous studies of the trade that existed on the Delaware River and Bay in mid-seventeenth century and the trade of Pennsylvanians on the Ohio from and after the middle of the eighteenth century. From about 1675 to about 1740 the literature is not wholly silent, but it is only intermittently revealing. The causes of this phenomenon need not be examined here. It is sufficient to observe that the blank places in the histories do not represent a paucity of events. Pennsylvania did indeed become the gateway to the west, and the fur traders did open the gate, but not entirely in the manner one might expect.

The customary image of the frontier is that of a line, sometimes expressed as an edge, sometimes as a wave. Frederick Jackson Turner's dictum is the classic statement: "In this advance [of westward expansion] the frontier is the outer edge of the wave—the meeting point between savagery and civilization." In developing his "edge of the wave" concept, Turner drew a series of lines: "The fall line marked the frontier of the seventeenth century; the Alleghenies that of the eighteenth," and so on. But the frontier of Pennsylvania in the early eighteenth century did not conform to a line. Examined closely, its phenomena disclose a web rather than a line, a network of relationships binding together the irregularly advancing Europeans with Indians whose movements show short-range advances within their long-range recession. Antagonisms existed, but the two populations supported each other through trade.

The business relationships between shifting communities of Amerindians and Euro-Americans generated the constant transformation of land functions desired by the latter. For those business relations to exist, Indians had to be brought and kept within the trading orbit of the province's merchants. The more Indians living within Pennsylvania, engaged in hunting and trading, the better business would be. We need not be surprised, then, to find that the province became a sanctuary.

The best work published so far is in Evelyn A. Benson's three articles for the Lancaster County Historical Society (LCHS), which show remarkable insight into the processes of the trade. I am indebted to her for fruitful suggestions of leads to be followed, especially for her description of the value of James Logan's Account Book and Ledger. See "The Earliest Use of the Term 'Conestoga Wagon,'" LCHS Publications 57 (1953) : pp. 109-119; "James Logan as the First Political Boss of Lancaster County When It Was the Wild Frontier," ibid. 59 (1955) : pp. 57-77; and "The Huguenot Le Torts: First Christian Family on the Conestoga," LCHS Journal (1961) : pp. 92-103.

Recently Professor Gary B. Nash has been studying William Penn's frustrated efforts to develop the Susquehanna valley. He has kindly shown me a draft of his interesting manuscript, but I have felt proper to make no use of it until publication which I hope will be soon.

1 The most frequently cited older work dealing with the trade at the Susquehanna is Charles A. Hanna, The Wilderness Trail, or the Ventures and Adventures of the Pennsylvania Traders on the Allegheny Path (2 vols., New York, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1911). It is a usefully detailed description of individual traders and their movements, but it displays such strong romantic and racial bias as to be untrustworthy for interpretation. It lacks valid understanding of the trader-Indian relationship as a phenomenon of cultural interaction, and Hanna seems to have been unaware of the business relationships between the Susquehanna traders and James Logan.

not only for white refugees from Europe, but for Indian refugees from other provinces. In this early phase of the frontier, the "advance of civilization" drew the Indians toward it instead of repelling them. Indian lodgement was temporary, of course. Growing white populations pushed the Indians northward as well as westward in two or three decades. But the temporary residence of the Indians facilitated the later permanent settlement by the whites. The lands cleared by Indian frontiersmen for their own farms and villages were the lands to which the white settlers invariably gravitated; the roads established by Indian hunters and traders were the routes used by the whites in their advance; and the constant traffic of the fur traders functioned as a means of communication as well as commerce.

Though trade was desired by both Indians and whites, its effects in the long run were accumulative for the whites and attritional for the Indians. Indians neglected their agriculture and concentrated on hunting because hunting produced the furs that could be traded for their new necessities. They did not "return to primitive conditions on a continually advancing frontier line," as Turner has suggested. The Indians' new and urgent concern was with hunting for the market, the international European market into which the Indians' products were now integrated. This was a quite different thing from reversion to a hunting and gathering stage of subsistence. Where subsistence is the rule, hunters are careful to restrain themselves to preserve breeding stock; they conserve as well as kill. But to supply the insatiable market, the Indians had to hunt with such destructive intensity as to exterminate the game. Lebensraum became an issue among the tribes. As worth-while hunting territories shrunk and receded, competition for their control produced large-scale intertribal war and commercial revolution. "Near" Indians struggled to master the trade routes to the "far" Indians of the Mississippi valley and Great Lakes regions, where valuable beaver and bear skin could still be had in plenty. As the traders, with eager Indian cooperation, emptied the woods far in advance of white farmers, the advance of white settlement continued, not in a wave but in splashes, spurts, trickles, and puddles; and still another competition arose among the Indians for the rights to sell the lands being settled. Disturbance grew as the Indians receded, but they did not take a firm stand in Pennsylvania until they had crossed the mountains.

Long before William Penn arrived in his province, the game of the Delaware valley had been destroyed for commercial purposes. Swedes and Dutchmen on the Delaware came to conduct the bulk of their trade with the powerful Susquehannock Indians of the Susquehanna valley, who contested bloodily for a quarter century with the Iroquois of the Mohawk valley for control of the trade routes to the west. For reasons that remain obscure, the Susquehannocks were attacked in 1675 by their former allies, the Marylanders and Virginians; and, in their weakened condition, the Susquehannocks negotiated a peace with the Iroquois that entailed the removal of most of them to the villages of the Iroquois confederacy. Thus, when Penn arrived in 1682, he found an uninhabited Susquehanna valley. None of the Indians near to his new colony had access to commercially important quantities of fur.

Penn had planned, even while in England, that the fur trade would play an important role in his colony, and he needed the revenue from it to help defray his staggering expenses. His expectations were wholly frustrated. The Indians of Maryland were kept under firm control by Lord Baltimore and the traders of the Chesapeake Bay; Baltimore's long quarrel with Penn over the location of the Maryland-Pennsylvania border made cooperation in trade not only unlikely but unthinkable. In the opposite direction, the Iroquois Indians of New York had long-established ties with the merchants of Albany. Nevertheless, because of the Iroquois' claim to own the Susquehanna valley, Penn decided to buy off their claim and propose a trade. Certainly, if he was to get any Indian trade worth the trouble, it would have to be along or through the Susquehanna valley.

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4 Turner, p. 2.
1683 Penn sent commissioners to treat with the Iroquois.8

The Albany merchants panicked. Iroquois informants told them that goods could be transported from the Iroquois villages down the Susquehanna much more easily and quickly than to Albany. To the Albanians, Penn became a menace more dire than the French. They resolved to “Putt a Stopp to all Proceedings,” and importuned their new Governor, Thomas Dongan, to “deny the treaty in this point.”9 Intrigues multiplied. Suddenly the Cayugas and Onondagas “remembered” that they had given the Susquehanna to New York’s Governor four years earlier “to rule over it,” but three Cayuga chiefs “now” gave it again “to the Governor Generall or to them that now Represent him.” Dongan happily cooperated in this interesting proceeding and “advised” Penn to stay out of the Susquehanna valley because “they have all of them agreed to Give Sesquehannah River to me and this Government.” Penn was absolutely balked for the time being.10

Because of the special importance of the Iroquois, we must dwell for a moment with them. Dongan’s predecessor as New York’s Governor had been Edmund Andros, who had established an interlinked series of alliances among the Indians and provincial governments, called the covenant chain. Under Andros, the tribes of the covenant chain had been equal in status. Dongan, however, was so intent on monopolizing the fur trade for Albany and pursuing an aggressive policy against the French of Canada that he enhanced the power and prestige of the Iroquois to make them more useful to his designs. When some refugee French coureurs du bois slipped off to the Schuylkill River and initiated a new trading venture (unaffiliated with Penn), Dongan called upon the Iroquois to interdict their trade. He even tried to get the Iroquois to seize all white traders who did not have license from the Albany Commissaries or himself. The Iroquois hesitated at interfering with whites, but they quickly seized upon the accession to their authority implicit in the policing of the trade. Thus began the noted “hegemony” of the Iroquois over the other Indians of the covenant chain. Besides the intrigue over the Susquehanna valley it consisted at first of four other elements: (1) Dongan’s order to the Iroquois to plunder all traders, French and English alike, not bearing his license; (2) Dongan’s authority for the Iroquois to demand “acknowledgment” from other Indians seeking to trade with Albany; (3) Dongan’s order to the Iroquois to police the trade of the Indians remaining in the Susquehanna valley; (4) Dongan’s levying of warriors from other tribes to serve as auxiliaries to the Iroquois in combat with the French. The effect of these actions was to raise the Iroquois to a position above that of the other Indians, even above most of the Europeans with whom the Iroquois had any contact, to be an executive instrument of Dongan’s schemes.11

Dongan’s policies were continued in the main, with only brief intermission, by his successors until the Iroquois changed their own policies. The Iroquois had been delighted by their assignment of compradore status among the tribes, but were less happy to find themselves embroiled in constant combat with the French in order to maintain their standing. As casualties increased while the English continued to let the Indians do the fighting, the Iroquois became dissatisfied with their trading dependence on Albany. In 1699 an Iroquois deputation visited Pennsylvania’s Governor William Markham to request an opening of trade relations. Markham’s acquiescence stirred the Albany merchants to action again, as in 1683, and once again New York’s Governor intervened. This time, he

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8 Wm. Penn to Capt. Brocles and Jo. West, 3 July, 1683, Pennsylvania Archives (Philadelphia and Harrisburg, 1852–1949), Second Series 7: p. 3. Hereinafter cited as Archives (1), Archives (2), etc., the number in parentheses denoting the series. Pagination varies in different printings of this set.


was Lord Bellomont. The nature of his remarks was not recorded, but it may be inferred by the fact that the Iroquois did not begin the trade with Pennsylvania which they themselves had solicited.\textsuperscript{12}

In 1701, however, they overthrew New York's controls, made a separate peace with the French, revised their strategy fundamentally thereafter to preserve neutrality between the English and French, and exerted themselves to improve their advantage in their covenant chain with other Indians. In due course they came to Pennsylvania yet once more.\textsuperscript{13}

It must not be thought that nothing had happened in Pennsylvania during the period of slack trade. Certain preconditions were fulfilled. One of these was the arrival in the province of several bands of Shawnees who settled along the Susquehanna and upper Delaware rivers. The Shawnee people were scattered in widely distributed bands to the south and west; through their western brethren the eastern Shawnees could obtain great quantities of peltry, and they became at once a very important factor in the fur trade generally. However, so far as Philadelphians were concerned, this fact was unknown because the eastern Shawnees were under Iroquois control, and Shawnee trade went where the Iroquois directed it. Among Indians, as among Europeans, trade and politics lived in the closest intimacy.\textsuperscript{14}

What Penn needed, without knowing it, was a means of going to the Indians who were prevented from coming to him. This need in Canada had created a corps of \textit{coureurs du bois}, wilderness peddlers whose personal independence was so great that many of them deserted to Albany when French regulations and prices became intolerable. Protected by Dongan, they soon demonstrated their independence of him too; some of them ventured into the forbidden Susquehanna region. The opportunity thus presented to penetrate Albany's blockade was not recognized by Penn. In his effort to deal justly and fairly with all Indians, he had laid down a rule that trading with them must be done under supervision in the open market at Philadelphia. The refugee Frenchmen in Pennsylvania seemed to Penn suspect and dangerous. Merchants of Philadelphia, actuated by what they called their "Innocent fears and Jealousies" of Frenchmen "Trading in Remote and Obscure places," incited Penn's deputy to fear spies and enemies in the backwoods. The merchants demanded that the Frenchmen be called in and forced to trade only in the towns.\textsuperscript{15}

The merchants had good reason to appeal for official help. In every respect except political patronage, the Frenchmen were superior competitors. They were energetic, skilled, and experienced. One of them had worked out of Fort Frontenac on the Great Lakes. Another, Peter Bizallon, had traveled down the Mississippi to its mouth with Henri de Tonti in 1686 in a fruitless effort to rendezvous with Robert de La Salle. In 1692 Shawnees coming from Fort St. Louis brought another of the refugees, Martin Chartier, who had been with La Salle on his fatal last journey. These dissident Canadians were drawn into some sort of organization by a Huguenot refugee from France, named Jacques Le Tort, who established a trading post in 1686 at a plantation near present-day Spring City on the Schuylkill. Penn's knowledge of the extent of their operations was minimal because Le Tort was not his man; the Huguenot worked instead for one of the strangling multitude of Penn's competitors. This one was the colorful Dr. Daniel Coxe, absentee Governor and a major proprietor of West Jersey.\textsuperscript{16} Before 1692 three of


\textsuperscript{16} "Dr. Daniel Coxe his Account of New Jersey," \textit{Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography} 7 (1883) : p. 331. Two Canadians named Petit and Salvaye
Coxe's Schuylkill River tenants, probably including Le Tort, found their way in a canoe across the Schuylkill's French Creek to the Susquehanna's Conestoga Creek, then up the Susquehanna and out its West Branch, by portage to the Allegheny, down it and the Ohio to the Mississippi, and up that father of waters to a "great yellow river" which they ascended. Returning, they made friendship with "over forty nations" of Indians, according to Coxe. Considering the experience and skill of his men, there is every reason to believe his tale. But none of this activity did Penn any good. Le Tort picked up his goods at Burlington, not Philadelphia. He transmitted his pelts and reports to Coxe, and Coxe later sold his property with a prospectus that boasted, "I can Exclude the Inhabitants of Pensilvania from this fur trade." Apparently he had been as good as his brag.

The Schuylkill organization broke up after the disappearance at sea of Jacques Le Tort in 1696, but his wife and son, and some of his associates remained in the province. Though Penn did not appreciate their potential, they were present and available when a man arrived who discovered how to use them. That man was James Logan whom Penn brought to Pennsylvania in 1699 as his secretary. Logan quickly won the confidence of the older man, and Penn came to entrust him with so many offices and responsibilities that Logan may properly be thought of as the New World steward of the Proprietary family. He was, at one time or another and sometimes all together, Secretary of the Province, Commissioner of Property, member of the Governor's Council, President of the Council, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Receiver of the Proprietary rents, keeper and transmitter of Proprietary funds, trustee of William Penn's will, merchant in international trade on behalf of the Proprietary family and in his own interest, attorney in land transactions for members of the Penn family in their private capacities, merchant in the Indian trade, specialist in Indian affairs for the government, land speculator, and cultured gentleman. His great talents, unfortunately, were matched by an engrossing preference for his own interest above all other, and he had a shrewd knack for extracting private gain out of the privileges and powers of his official functions. Logan was the man who created a lucrative and lasting Indian trade in Pennsylvania and, as Joseph E. Johnson has remarked, Logan "made a success in it because he was prepared to be as ruthless and unscrupulous as necessary." It took a few years, however, for him to learn the trade, and a few more years to engross it.

This Indian trade was rather more complex than it sometimes seems today. Immediately after William Penn's final return to England, he exhorted Logan to send bear and buck skins, "for they bear an advance," but Logan was no more able to turn the trade on at will than Penn had been. There were five distinct conditions to be met before it could be conducted successfully. Primary in importance, of course, were Indians to trade with. To Logan, in 1702, it appeared that his colony was "quite destitute of Indians." This was not accurate, as we have seen, but it probably appeared so then to Logan in Philadelphia. A second factor involved problems of communication: the trading Indians had to have access to good hunting grounds, running off to Albany in 1686 or 1687. They showed up in Pennsylvania in partnership with Peter Bizaillon who had squatted on land that Le Tort took over in the names of Sir Mathias Vincent and Dr. Daniel Coxe. The large tract is shown on Thomas Holme's 1687 map of Pennsylvania under the names of Vincent, Coxe, and two other proprietors.


Dr. Coxe's Memorial of 1719 to the Lords of Trade claims and describes the journey. I have named the specific creeks in eastern Pennsylvania from knowledge that they were commonly traveled by traders and known even to William Penn. Alvord and Bidgood have disparaged Coxe's claims on the assumption that he was just concocting another "bubble," but his details are confirmed from other sources, his geographical data could have been acquired only from direct exploration, and his men were already experienced in far western travel. Clarence W. Alvord and Lee Bidgood, The First Explorations of the Trans-Allegheny Region by the Virginians, 1560-1674 (Cleveland, Arthur H. Clark Co., 1912), pp. 231-249. See also Albright G. Zimmerman, "Daniel Coxe and the New Mediterranean Sea Company," Pa. Mag. of Hist. and Biog. 76 (1952): pp. 86-96; and Evelyn A. Benson, "The Huguenot Le Torts" (cited, n. 1), pp. 99-100; Coxe's Account of New Jersey (cited, n. 16), 328; Markham to Nicholson, Md. Arch. 20: p. 470.

20 ibid. 1: p. 89.
and for this they had to have protection from hostile Indians. A third factor was organization, and the key necessity for it was skilled personnel—experienced traders who knew the woods and the tribes and had plenty of stamina. A fourth factor was stock: abundance of goods was essential at all times so that unscheduled customers/suppliers could always be accommodated. Finally, and trickiest of all, there was the problem of competition. No holds were barred in the Indian trade. If Indians needed protection in the woods, traders also needed protection in the towns. The custom was for politically powerful men to run what today would be called a protection racket. Traders within the syndicate, so to speak, were immune from the penalties of the law; competitors were outside its protection. Monopoly was the great goal, for, then as now, monopoly multiplied profit.

Complex though these requirements were, circumstances combined, soon after 1701, to make it possible for Logan to meet them all. Indians came into view as a consequence of the failure of New York’s aggressive strategy against the French. In 1701, when the French started building a fort at Detroit that would exclude the Iroquois from their western hunting grounds, New York’s Lieutenant Governor Nanfan was helpless to do anything about it but urge the Iroquois to stop the French. The Iroquois by this time knew their inability to do anything of the sort, and they bitterly told the English to stop the French themselves. They were angry too about the conditions of trade at Albany: goods were expensive and scarce, the weighing scales were rigged, and the traders cheated.

What was most important to Pennsylvania in this falling out was the end of Albany’s stranglehold on the trade of all the Indians. Not only the Iroquois themselves, but also the covenant chain Indians whose trade the Iroquois had policed for Albany began to cast about for other trading partners. Suddenly one day in 1704 the Council at Philadelphia found itself entertaining two Onondagans with a message that a company of their people would soon be down to trade. They hoped to “be encouraged to come yearly and keep up a friendly Correspondence.” There was much excitement. When the delegation did arrive, little was recorded about the negotiations but apparently all went amicably, and Secretary Logan was on hand to make a speech and give presents. A few months later, two Shawnees from up the Delaware arrived also to inquire about trade, and Philadelphia was in business.

Thus two necessities of the trade were acquired: a body of trading Indians and security of access for them to all the hunting grounds under the protection of the great covenant chain. The third necessity, skilled personnel, became available when Jacques Le Tort’s son James applied in 1703 for a job with a planter-trader named Edward Farmer whose estate at Whitemarsh was well situated for trade with the local Indians. Farmer seems to have been trading already with another member of the old Le Tort organization, Peter Bizaillon. Farmer came of an aristocratic family, he was a Justice of the Peace, and he traded discreetly with James Logan. Le Tort had gone to the right man. Logan’s power at the moment, and for some years thereafter, was far from supreme, but Logan had many resources and the will to use them. After Bizaillon and Le Tort associated with Farmer—i.e., sub rosa with Logan—Logan championed the Frenchmen against charges of spying and subversion, and found bail for them when necessary. For the traders it would not be a wholly satisfactory arrangement until 1712 because Logan’s support earned them the wrath of men who may have cared little about the fur trade but hoped to bring down Logan by exploiting the association, as it became gradually more visible, between Logan and the Frenchmen.

Perhaps Bizaillon and Le Tort had no real choice. Besides, there were very real advantages to affiliating with Logan. One of them can be seen in the Conestoga treaty of 1705. In October, 1705, Logan journeyed to Conestoga to allay the restlessness of the Indians who had been aroused by hostilities of Maryland and Virginia against the Conoy Indians. Logan welcomed the Conoys.

22 Logan to Penn, 26 July, 28 Sept., 1704, Logan Letter Books 1: pp. 158, 163, HSP; Council, 9, 10, 18 May, 9, 28 Aug., 1 Sept., 1704, 2: pp. 150, 141, 145, 155, 158-159.
23 James Logan to Edward Farmer, 20 May 1703, Logan Letter Books 2: p. 25, HSP.
24 Farmer’s connection with Logan has remained unnoticed because of Logan’s desire to keep his personal interest in the fur trade as secret as possible and because of subsequent bibliographic complications. Logan’s letter to Farmer (cited, n. 23) was miscataloged because of flourishes in the handwriting, and Logan’s explicit statement to Penn that Farmer was the man “with whom chiefly I Deal” was omitted from the printed copy of his letter to Penn of 24 June, 1703. Cited Logan Letter Books, 1: p. 100, HSP, and Penn-Logan Corr. 1: p. 199.
against him. Among Logan’s surviving papers is Le Tort’s account of debts due himself, dated October, 1704, and Le Tort was in jail all through October.27 One infers that Le Tort prepared the statement for Logan, probably because the debts to Le Tort were at one remove debts to Logan. More than likely, the trader’s imprisonment was ordered because of the jangled nerves of Council members during a period when Indian hostilities were very much on everyone’s mind. During 1703, New England had suffered heavily from Indian raids directed by the French, and in February of 1704 came the Indians’ morale-shattering raid on Deerfield, Massachusetts. That Le Tort was jailed in Pennsylvania in the following month may even have been for his own good, considering the fears of the populace. Logan’s subsequent conduct shows only a gradual deepening and strengthening of the bond between them.

In February, 1707, in a supreme effort to dislodge Logan from office, the Assembly adopted Articles of Impeachment against him. He was charged with attempts to “subvert the Law, and to introduce an arbitrary Government.” Later the Assembly presented a Remonstrance that listed his countenancing of the French traders as a grievance in evidence of the charge. Two of the traders, “viz. Nichola, and Letort,” were “reckoned very dangerous Persons” in the Assembly’s view, but the fact was noted that “all three” had been to Canada “and yet are permitted to trade with the Indians.” It was no trivial charge; France and Britain were still at war.28

On the same day that the Assembly voted Logan’s impeachment, his political ally, Governor Evans, told the uneasy Conestoga Indians of his confidence in the traders. But the contents of the Assembly’s Remonstrance were too grave to be brushed aside, so Governor Evans set out for the Susquehanna to mend some fences. At the Shawanee village of Pequehan he was entertained at Martin Chartier’s house. After treating with the Susquehanna tribes, he journeyed upstream to Paxtang where he enlisted James Le Tort’s help

26 Council, 17 Aug., 1703, 2: p. 100; Logan to Penn, 2 Sept., 1703, Logan Letter Books, 1: p. 115, HSP.
27 Council, 9 May, 6, 31 Oct., 1, 2 Nov., 1704, 2: pp. 140, 163, 170–172; Le Tort’s account of debts due him, October, 1704, Logan Papers, 11: p. 4, HSP.
to seize "one Nicole, a French Trader . . . against whom great Complaints had been made to the Governor." 29 The Assembly's Remonstrance had linked Le Tort's and Nicole's names together in its complaint; yet here was the Governor, not only failing to seize Le Tort, but acting in close cooperation with him. The upshot was that the Assembly got a sacrificial victim for its fears in such a way that the authorities in London could be told that the Pennsylvania government was alert and responsive to backwoods threats, while the Le Tort-Bizaillon-Chartier-Logan trading association lost another competitor. There is often an aesthetically gratifying quality about the economy and audacity of Logan's political maneuvers. He frequently contrived to serve two or more interests at the same time, and he was master of the art of turning defensive operations to positive advantage.

His enemies knew how to strike at him from other directions than the Assembly. The collector of customs—a Crown officer—confiscated two shipments of goods imported by Peter Bizaillon "because imported by a foreigner." Logan drew Penn into the transaction by urging Penn's help to naturalize foreigners in the province. Penn promised, "I shall get them either naturalized or endenized by the Queen." 30

At the height of the hue and cry against him, Logan still controlled the Commissioners of Property—who were solely responsible to the Proprietary—as though the elected Assembly did not exist. So, when Peter Bizaillon requested "free liberty" to build a house and plant fields "on any of the Lands above Conestoga not Possesst Or made use by the Indians," the Commissioners were pleased to grant his request. They stipulated that tenure would be held at their pleasure, but the rent was cheap—one deer skin yearly.31

Bizaillon's prosperity depended heavily on his patron. When Logan finally fled to England to escape the Assembly's threat of arrest, Bizaillon soon found his goods seized by the new Governor, Charles Gookin. Until Logan returned, Bizaillon and Le Tort returned to the security bond and jail term routine. Finally, in March of 1712, Logan came back, triumphant over his enemies, and, in May, Bizaillon was issued a license to trade with the Indians "as he had formerly done." 32 Perhaps it was coincidence that a Conestoga Indian delegation came to Philadelphia in July of the same year with complaints that their prices had risen since traders had been required to have licenses. Logan replied that all traders were in business for gain; the war, not the licenses, had caused price increases. As for the Indians' other complaints—of traders' livestock damaging their corn—Logan expressed regrets but pointed out that "none had ever been allowed by us to settle amongst them but Peter Bizalion," and promised recompense.33

A final factor in the Indian trade was the acquisition and maintenance of a stock of the right kinds of goods. On this point Logan was explicit. Answering Penn's demands for an Indian trade, he wrote in July, 1703, that furs could not be had without the specialties called Indian goods: the coarse woolens called strowds and duffels, powder, small bar lead, shirts, and good cheap guns. Logan insisted again in September: "I cannot possibly get skins as I would for want of goods, for Even Money will not buy them. Wm. Trent and T. Murray who have laid plans for it engross that Trade." 34 Logan continued to decry shortages of goods as his reason for not remitting more furs, but the activity of his traders is at odds with his reports.

Penn pressed hard for a Proprietary monopoly on the Indian trade, which would obviate the need for "any levy, excise, or tax" for his expenses in the government of the province. He emphasized the request with the cry: "O that we had a fur-trade instead of a tobacco one, and that thou wouldst do all that is possible to master furs and skins for me . . . I earnestly press thee upon this one point, as thou desirest to assist me in the readiest and surest way." Logan refused even to offer such a proposal to the Assembly. "The merchants will never bear it," he responded. "Contrivance and management may give thee a share with the rest, and more is not to be depended on." 35 Two things are wrong, in different ways,

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with that answer. If it were true, as Logan affirmed, that the merchants Trent and Murray had engrossed the fur trade, why would the Assembly—assuming its members were as selfish as Logan painted them—why would it not let Penn have the trade instead of only those two men, and thus escape Penn's constant dunning for funds? The other thing wrong is that Logan himself was, in fact, one of the merchants that Penn was going to have to share with.

There can be small doubt of Logan's ability as a merchant. In spite of, or perhaps because of, his multifarious official activities, he was able to live as a gentleman for over a decade, absorbing the expenses of a voyage to England and two years' residence there, and accumulating £1,000 of estate, by his own reckoning—all without a shilling of salary. But the Assembly's hostility, Penn's supervision, and a shortage of capital had cramped Logan's style. During his stay in England he found ways to enlarge his freedom of action.

He obtained from Penn a grant of £1,000 of retroactive salary, and picked up cheaply a number of Original Rights for a total of 8,000 acres of unpatented and unlocated Pennsylvania lands. (Penn became suspiciously curious when he heard later about the land speculation, and Logan was far from candid in his reply to Penn's inquiry.36) With ready cash and highly negotiable land rights Logan had the material prerequisites for large-scale operations.

His political and administrative situations were also greatly improved. While in England he had persuaded Penn to write an agonized appeal to the Assembly to cease factionalism and opposition, and the letter was so effective that Logan returned to a docile and cooperative legislature.37 In his special role as Proprietary steward Logan became more potent than Penn himself, for Penn's debts had been taken over by a company of receivers to whom the whole province was mortgaged as security; the receivers gave Logan responsibility and full authority to raise the money.38

As though fate had decided to remove all possibility of restraint upon Logan, even the supervision exerted by Penn remotely, through correspondence, was removed. Penn suffered a series of strokes, beginning in 1712, that disabled him for business, and his wife put her whole reliance upon Logan.39 For the next six years his power was supreme in Pennsylvania. During that period he built a trading organization in the Susquehanna valley that profoundly influenced the growth of both the province and a still unborn nation.

The methods and processes of Logan's trading organization have never been fully described. Indians, of course, were illiterate, and their only contributions to the records were repeated complaints at conferences and councils that the traders cheated and abused them and debauched them with rum. Traders, for the most part, were only slightly more literate than the Indians, and they never caught the habit of preserving papers—with good reason, it would seem. Disinterested travelers to the centers of trade simply did not exist. To get any considerable body of records, we are forced to rely on three major sources: the business records and private correspondence of James Logan; the official surveys, deeds, and patents relating to the lands on which the trade was conducted; and the minutes of conferences between the Indians and representatives of the provincial government. A large proportion of the total mass of these documents was penned by Logan himself; an even larger proportion was at one time or another in his keeping and subject to alterations made or directed by him. As will appear, he did not hesitate to adjust records to his purpose. Fortunately he left discrepancies, and there are just enough non-Logan sources to outline a fairly understandable picture.

Logan's classically simple view was that "All men of business think it unnatural to be doing something for nothing."40 After the most successful period of his trade at the Susquehanna, he com-

36 Salary: James Logan's Account Book, 1712–1719, p. 2, HSP. Interestingly, Logan notes that he paid himself most of this money two years before Penn authorized it.


39 Proud (cited, n. 37), 2: p. 58. Penn was stricken while in the midst of a letter of bitter complaint to Logan about the latter's failure to forward funds. Wm. and Hannah Penn to Logan, 4 and 13 Oct., 1712, Penn MSS., Letters of the Penn Family to James Logan 1: p. 50, HSP.

40 James Logan to John Penn, 26 June, 1728, Penn MSS. Official Correspondence 2: p. 9, HSP.
plained that the fur trade had become “as mean as most others,” but he acknowledged that it had once brought “a good return.” During the good years a merchant could double his money in sterling every two or three years in spite of traders dying in debt. Calculations of Logan’s net worth, drawn from two of his record books, show an increase from £2,261 in the spring of 1712 to £11,889 in the spring of 1720. The calculations were made as follows.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major Assets, 25 March 1712</th>
<th>£</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lands in Pennsylvania</td>
<td>1,015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lands in Jersey</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net from Isaac Norris (for matters in his care during Logan’s absence abroad)</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest in Chester Mills</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest in ship Hope Galley</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accounts owed Logan</td>
<td>213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Due from William Penn (rem (remainder of grant)</td>
<td>238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Due from Assembly</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worth, 25 March 1712</td>
<td>2,261</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of the foregoing, nearly half (£1,000) had been a grant by William Penn, made while Logan was in England, as a recompense for Logan’s previous services. The rest (£1,261) may be assumed to be Logan’s savings from his years in Pennsylvania. The whole was a respectable sum but not Great Wealth.

In 1720 Logan opened a new ledger and drew up a balance of what we today would call Assets and Liabilities, as follows. (He called it an Account of Stock.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assets</th>
<th>£</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Goods</td>
<td>2,391</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stock abroad</td>
<td>2,342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lots and lands in Pennsylvania</td>
<td>2,980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lands in Jersey</td>
<td>1,986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Balances in Ledger A”</td>
<td>4,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total assets</td>
<td>13,699</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Liabilities</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“Balances in Ledger A”</td>
<td>1,810</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worth, 1 March 1720</td>
<td>11,889</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There is reason to believe that the 1720 balance greatly underestimates the value of lands in Pennsylvania, some of which were not publicly carried in Logan’s own name; and one would like to know what “Ledger A” contained. The point is dazzlingly clear, however, that Logan’s possessions had multiplied over five times in eight years. These were the years when he systematized his operation of the Indian trade and coordinated it with his dealings in land.

The processes by which this wealth was created involved a number of operations in which Logan played a variety of roles. Each year Logan the merchant imported goods from England which he then resold, usually on credit, to individual traders. The traders carried the goods to Indian villages and resold again, also on credit, to the natives. Payment was made in peltry after the Indians returned from their hunting. The traders returned to the city with the pelts to discharge their debts to Logan. He sold the skins in England through merchant associates there, and with the proceeds bought more goods for the next year’s cycle of operations. Joseph E. Johnson’s compilation shows that in the years, 1713–1717, Logan shipped skins and furs that brought nearly £8,000 sterling of which £3,766 was his own share. His profits in this period averaged over eighty per cent a shipment. In 1718 he shipped 30 chests and cases of skins and furs, valued at £1,379, of which 7/12 was his own interest. In 1720 he shipped or sold about £1,050 worth. In 1721 the amount was £1,511, and in 1722 it was £1,291. As Logan kept books the amount of profit shown on the sale of peltry seems surprisingly small at first glance. In 1721, a good year, it was only £113. Such returns would not explain the rise of Logan’s fortune.

The explanation lies in the fact that the sale of peltry was only one phase in the cycle of the trade. In Logan’s books, profit was only the difference between the cost of a commodity and its selling price, so that the profit on peltry arose only from the transactions in which the traders sold skins to Logan which he resold to London. But Logan also made 5 per cent commissions and charged 21 per cent storage, not only on shipments for accounts of others but on his own skins as well, thus averaging £75 additional annually. He also profited on the sale of imported manufactured goods.
goods to the traders in the counter movement of the cycle of the trade, and he kept a profit and loss account on every individual commodity. Thus, in 1721, the coarse woolens called strowds were sold to traders for a £53 profit, rum cleared £45, and powder £50.49 By these three commodities alone, the peltry profit for that year was greatly surpassed. Thus, to get a clear idea of the total profit of the trade, all the individual commodity profits must be added to the profit of the peltry which was just one more commodity in the total trading process. Actually the manufactured goods were much the more profitable. Logan marked them up nearly 150 per cent.50 Exaggerating somewhat to make the point, one might even go so far as to say that the peltry was tolerated in the trade because it was the only commodity at the disposal of the ultimate source of all this profit—the Indians. The great advantage of dealing with Indians was that they could be kept under fairly steady controls of access and prices. Controlled markets yield high profits. But the Indians would not—not—have bought Logan’s beads and bedlace if he had not bought their skins and furs. Thus Logan’s gratifying profits as a merchant of trade goods were inseparably linked to his smaller net as a merchant of fur. It was all one business; its comprehensive name is properly the Indian trade rather than the fur trade. When the entire process is seen, it suggests that the “old” British empire of mercantilist days may not have been very much different from the “new” empire of Victoria. Even before the Industrial Revolution, native peoples of the colonies were important outlets for British manufactures.51

In the Indian trade, Logan the merchant was helped enormously to control his markets and his marketing organization by Logan the Commissioner of Property, Logan the Secretary of the province, and Logan the agent of the Penn family. When Logan the merchant did not wish to risk his own money for his own business, Logan the Proprietary agent might lend the Proprietary’s money to the trader, as he did with Edward Green, “to free him of his Debts and thereupon to Engage his Trade to me, which sum [of £40] I lend out of the Proprietor’s and Trustees’ Effects because they have so great an Advantage by my Trade.”52 After the trader had proved his usefulness, Logan the Commissioner of Property and political boss could arrange quietly with his trusty ally, the Surveyor General, to lay out a tract of land for the trader to use as a base of operations. Thus the same Edward Green had 200 acres surveyed for him “near Nottingham” in Chester County in 1721.53 The Land Office was closed at the time so that no purchase of the land could legally have been made, but in such matters Logan was the law.

The quantities of land that Logan thus provided for his traders accumulated to an amazing acreage. The non-definitive list on p. 417 includes names of traders whom Logan trusted with substantial amounts of credit, as noted in his business records. Logan’s allotments of lands to his traders were not the only benefits he could confer upon them. As Secretary of the province, he conducted diplomatic negotiations with the Indians, and the records of Indian treaties show that his own traders—particularly Le Tort, Bizaillon, Peter Chartier, and Edmond and John Cartlidge—were hired repeatedly as official interpreters and messengers. Such employment pointedly impressed the Indians with the traders’ influential connections and added immeasurably to their prestige.

When two of Logan’s leading traders, Edmond and John Cartlidge, precipitated a crisis by murdering a Seneca Indian, Logan hurried the government to their support; he made a pretense of seizing them for trial and publicly denouncing them, but he then spent government funds for a present to the Iroquois to win absolution for his men, and as soon as the Iroquois accepted the blood money

49 Logan’s Ledger, p. 100.
51 In 1681 William Penn wrote that Englishmen should consider how many thousand Blacks and Indians are also accommodated with Cloaths and many sorts of Tools and Utensils from England, and that Their Labour is mostly brought hither, which adds Wealth and People to the English Dominions. “Some Account of the Province of Pensilvania,” Narratives of Early Pennsylvania, West New Jersey, and Delaware, 1630-1710, Albert Cook Myers, ed. (New York, Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1912), p. 204.
52 Logan’s Account Book, 23 Nov., 1716, p. 189.
Taylor’s Account of Lands is a pamphlet notebook in which surveyor Isaac Taylor recorded the actual dates and acreages of his surveys of unsettled lands, which must be distinguished from the frequently misleading information to be found in the minutes of the Commissioners of Property. The pamphlet is essential and invaluable in interpreting deeds.
### Lands Alotted to Traders of James Logan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trader's name</th>
<th>Acreage arranged</th>
<th>Location Description</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Arrangement</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Stephen Atkinson</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>Susquehanna R.</td>
<td>Survey</td>
<td>Settled by permission</td>
<td>1718</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Peter Bizaillon</td>
<td></td>
<td>Above Conestoga</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Peter Bizaillon</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>&quot;Next to his plantation.&quot;</td>
<td>Susquehanna R. above Conestoga</td>
<td>Survey</td>
<td>1718</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Martha Bizaillon</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>Between Pequea and Conestoga creeks</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Richard Carter</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>Susquehanna R.</td>
<td>Purchase</td>
<td></td>
<td>1719</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Peter Chartier</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>Head of Pequea Creek</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Richard Cloud</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>Pequea Creek</td>
<td>Survey</td>
<td></td>
<td>1718</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Moses Combs</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>Susquehanna R.</td>
<td>Purchase</td>
<td></td>
<td>1719</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Jonas Davenport</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>&quot;Next to Moses Combs&quot;</td>
<td>Survey</td>
<td></td>
<td>1719</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Edward Green</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>Near Nottingham</td>
<td>Survey</td>
<td></td>
<td>1721</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. James Hendricks</td>
<td>622</td>
<td>Susquehanna R.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1100</td>
<td>Conestoga Creek</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. James Le Tort</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>Donegal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. James Paterson</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>Conestoga Manor</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Abraham Penington</td>
<td>400-500</td>
<td>Above Octoraro Creek</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

He restored the Cartlidges to their favored place in his trading organization.55

In his benefactions, Logan was by no means playing the philanthropist. His attitude was quintessentially of the eighteenth century: self-interest was his first concern. When he saved the Cartlidges it was because they were valuable in his organization and intimately familiar with details of his business that he could not afford to have publicized. When he allotted (Penn's) lands to his traders, it was because he thereby gave them an advantage over competitive traders and thus improved his own business. He never allotted his own lands to a trader, and when traders got into debt to Logan himself he seized their possessions, including the lands he had so generously distributed from the estates of the Penn family. When he conducted negotiations with the Indians he not only hired his own men with Proprietary or provincial funds; he bought ceremonial presents for the Indians out of the same funds. As merchant he could sell presents to the Secretary who was conducting the negotiations. As Secretary, he bought. As Proprietary agent he purchased more presents for the Proprietaries' private dealings with the Indians, and again as merchant he could sell. He never claimed to sell to anyone at cost. In all these dealings he handled not only his own money but the Proprietaries' also, and frequently sums from the public treasury of the province. It is evident from his books that he juggled accounts in various ways, and in a colony where cash was always scarce his ability to lay hands on some

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55 The Cartlidge case is described in detail in Francis P. Jennings, "Miquon's Passing" (cited, n. 6), pp. 197-217.
money at almost any time must have been an advantage of large proportions. These were all good reasons for Logan's becoming master of the Indian trade in Pennsylvania. Besides these there was the fact that his variety of official powers, especially over land distribution, made him an object of concerned and cooperative attention of people who wanted favors, so that, while he had enemies in plenty, he also had a dependable phalanx of allies. They gave him added capacity for maneuver, as in the instance when Logan used Israel Pemberton, Sr., as a dummy purchaser of lands in order to conceal their actual acquisition by Logan himself.56

One more advantage must be mentioned and described, for it had the most profound effects on Indian society and history as well as on the development of the province of Pennsylvania. Logan used his trading organization as a means to locate and pre-empt potentially valuable lands. The process occurred repeatedly. Through his activities as a land speculator Logan was able to salvage the loans he might otherwise have lost through the bankruptcy that so often afflicted traders. The procedures followed three steps. First, Logan allotted Proprietary lands to a trader, or gave permission to the trader to settle on a tract and make "improvements"; i.e., build a house, barn, and store, clear land for crops and grazing, and so on. No permanent title to the land was thus conferred, but a prior claim was established by the improver who acquired what were later to be called "squatter's rights." So long as the trader was in business, Logan was in business also, as merchant. When the trader's debts became too large to be safely continued, or when he died in debt, Logan foreclosed on all his property, including the rights he had established in the land and improvements. After so much activity and development, the land had grown in value, often quite considerably; but Logan, with all his privileges, was always able on his third step to establish a valid legal title at the same rates that applied to undeveloped lands. Through this process Logan converted the transitory profits of the Indian trade, which had clearly discernible historical limitations, into the time-tested substance of an estate in land.

The process is well exemplified by his trading center at the Indian village of Conestoga. Logan had been dealing with various traders in the vicinity until he came to some sort of special arrangement with John Cartlidge in 1716. Logan then provided a warrant for Cartlidge to settle on 300 acres of land immediately next to Conestoga village. The matter was privately arranged, with Cartlidge paying nothing to the Proprietaries, whose land it was; and a stock of goods was provided for him by Logan.57

The land was actually surveyed on 22 October, 1717, by Chester County surveyor Isaac Taylor who was brother to the provincial Surveyor General Jacob Taylor.58 Isaac's primary job at the time was to survey 16,000 acres as the Proprietary manor of Conestoga. Such manors were supposed to preserve their enclosed lands for the Proprietors, free of settlement until nearby population increase had made them valuable. Enclosing the Indian village within the manor provided an unchallengeable justification for creating the manor, since William Penn's treaty of 1701 had guaranteed the Conestoga Indians a right of residence. Thus, when Isaac Taylor surveyed Conestoga Manor (on 21 October, 1717) his work ostensibly had nothing to do with James Logan's personal business; the Indians had been uneasy over rumors that they would be dispossessed, and the manor was surveyed to allay their fears.59 But in the process Logan managed to pick up a bit of real estate for himself. The dates are illuminating. Logan's tracts within the manor were laid out one day following the survey of the manor itself. In addition to the 300 acres surveyed nominally for John Cartlidge, 700 more were laid out for Logan personally.60 Great secrecy shrouded the transaction, 57 Commissioners, Bk. H, 18 March, 1718, Archives (2), 19: p. 644. Logan's Account Book, 27 Nov., 1716, has entry for £70 worth of goods for John Cartlidge, "now of Conestogoe."

58 Taylor's Account of Lands, "Lands on Susquehanna River." Identification of brothers: Taylor Papers, title page of any volume. The Commissioners of Property did not issue a formal warrant to survey Conestoga Manor until 1 Feb., 1718. Date of warrant is inscribed on Taylor's draft, Cadwalader Collection, Thomas Cadwalader, Box 6a, fol. Miscellaneous Land Papers.


60 Pa. Pat. Bk. A-9, p. 493. The survey draft (cited, n. 58) bears an inscription that Logan's land had been laid out "without his knowledge or consent." This statement must be dismissed as attempted deception. The conspiratorial relationship between Logan and the Taylor family of surveyors is revealed by a merely casual inspection of the correspondence in Vol. 14 of the Taylor Papers.
made possible by the fact that records of the Land Office were private property of the Proprietaries and therefore immune to inspection by officials of government or private individuals not commissioned by the Penns.

Actually surveyor Taylor had been busy in the Conestoga area a full year earlier for another of Logan's traders, James Hendricks.61 And when Taylor laid out Conestoga Manor, he also surveyed tracts for the major part of 6,675 acres that had been purchased by a set of recent immigrants from the Palatinate.62 His drafts show many of these tracts within the manor.

Indian disturbance grew so great that the Commissioners of Property voted £20 to fence in the Indians' corn "from the Horses, Cattle and Hogs of those new Settlers." 63 The fence was built with trader Cartlidge's tract inside it, and Cartlidge thus became a semi-official resident ambassadress of the province.64 We may note that the fence which so enhanced Cartlidge's trading position was built with the funds of the Proprietaries. Cartlidge applied to the Commissioners of Property for a formal grant of his already surveyed 300 acres, and they approved the grant at their usual minimum price of £10 per hundred acres. It is evident that the mention of price was purely for the record; the money was not paid, nor was anyone in the Land Office indiscreet enough to dun for it.65 Through Cartlidge, Logan established a store on the grounds, and began trundling goods and furs to and fro in the first Conestoga wagon of record. The store became a distribution and collection center. Other traders saved themselves the trip to Philadelphia by bringing their peltry to Conestoga for shipment by the wagon to the city—for a fee, naturally.66 Cartlidge himself did a large-scale business, but he seems to have suffered from the usual shortcomings of Indian traders as businessmen. He died in 1723, owing Logan £612.67

As we have seen, the larger of Logan's profits were made on the manufactured goods he lent out for trade, which argues a high mark-up, which implies in turn that Cartlidge's apparent debt represented a much smaller money investment by Logan. Nevertheless, such an apparently heavy loss would have been a disaster for any other merchant. Not for Logan. He set out to liquidate the debt by seizing all the goods in Cartlidge's possession at his death. These seem to have included both merchandise and peltry in substantial amounts. They were all turned over to another of Logan's traders, Andrew Cornish, for continued operation of the store. Logan moved also to get legal possession of the buildings and equipment as well as the land of the trading center. He worked again through an agent to mask his own involvement; this time it was the merchant, Israel Pemberton, Sr. Shortly after John Cartlidge's death, the Commissioners of Property granted Pemberton the 300 acres of the store at Conestoga "intended for the Use of the Said John Cartlidge's Heir." In point of fact, Cartlidge's debt to Logan required that the Heir's estate be turned over to Logan. After a delay of still another year, Logan even put up the money that Cartlidge should have paid seven years earlier for the land. Logan did not appear openly as the owner until many years later, but his own records show that he paid £45 for the 300 acres, presumably through Pemberton. Still later, he sold the tract to Andrew Cornish who mortgaged it to Logan for £500, Pennsylvania currency, in 1729; but Cornish must have defaulted, for the tract reverted to Logan and was bequeathed to his heirs.68 All the while that Cartlidge's 300 acres were so busy, the 700-acre adjoining tract that had been surveyed directly to Logan remained de facto in Logan's possession without payment of so much as a shilling. When he finally moved to take legal title to it, he applied Original Rights he had picked up in 1731 for £5 sterling per hundred acres. A

61 Taylor's Account of Lands, "Lands on Conestogo and the Mill-Creek"; Logan's Account Book, pp. 185, 198.
63 Commissioners, 2 Jan., 1718, Archives (2), 19: p. 626.
65 Cartlidge's warrant was backdated to 11 Dec., 1716: Commissioners, Bk. H, 18 March, 1718, Archives (2), 19: p. 644. The terms of the patent under which Logan finally gained legal title to the tract show that no purchase money had been paid prior to the issue of the patent in 1737: Pa. Pat. Bk. A-9, p. 493.
66 See Evelyn A. Benson, "Conestoga Wagon" (cited, n. 1).
67 Logan's Ledger, p. 36.
68 Accounts given by local historians of these transactions are contradictory and confusing. What happened has to be pieced together from several sources. Items in Logan's Ledger, under John Cartlidge's and Andrew Cornish's accounts, provide a start. These must be supplemented by the recital of ownership sequence contained in Pa. Pat. Bk. A-9, pp. 490 and 493. Location of the tract is shown on a draft in the Land Office Transcripts, Bk. D-88, 80, Dept. of Internal Affairs, Harrisburg. The resurvey warrant, 24 June, 1734 is in Land Office Transcripts, Bk. D-85, p. 249. Cornish's mortgage, with an indorsement showing the reversion to Logan, is in Lancaster County Court House Deed Books A-1, p. 1, and L-1, p. 266, dated 3 May, 1729, and 23 Oct., 1767.
comparison of this price with the amount of the mortgage on Cornish’s (ex-Cartlidge’s) adjacent tract will give some notion of the fantastic bargain it represented. For £35 sterling Logan secured title to the 700-acre tract; Cornish mortgaged the 300-acre tract for £500. Even the difference in exchange between sterling and Pennsylvania currency does little to reduce the gap.\footnote{Pa. Pat. Bk. F-5, p. 269 (see also n. 68). The first purchasers of the Original Rights in question had bought from William Penn in 1681 at the rate of £2 per hundred acres: Gratz Collection, Papers of the Governors, Case 2, Box 33-a, HSP.}

The secrecy and duplicity employed by Logan to conceal his part in these proceedings did not arise out of modesty. What he was doing, in fact, was to embezzle Proprietary property. It is necessary to be meticulous in tracking down any transaction of value in which Logan was involved. Even in his private correspondence, he usually wrote guardedly, with the possibility in mind that letters might miscarry; and he never ceased to complain about how much he was sacrificing his own interests for the good of the Proprietary family. He wrote righteously to William Penn, on 26 February, 1713, that “in what [land] I have taken or shall take up, I have no other Privilege than . . . every man in the Province . . . I have generally had a much greater regard to thy Interest than my own and yet it has pleased God, in his Divine Providence, to bless me beyond my own thoughts or Contrivance.”\footnote{Taylor Papers, n.d., 14: p. 2903. Other contents of letter put it in 1713, and a survey of 700 acres was made for Logan by Taylor on 18 July, 1713: Taylor’s Account of Lands, “Lands at the Head of Pequa.” Emphasis not in source.}

Within a couple of months, however, Logan wrote to surveyor Isaac Taylor to lay out a tract “of about 7 or 800 Acres . . . without giving any other person the preference.”\footnote{Logan to Penn, 26 Feb., 1713, Archives (2), 7: p. 34.} Slips like this one, together with the overwhelming weight of evidence in the land records, must lead us to reject entirely such selfserving declarations as Logan made about “my great caution in avoiding to direct the Location of my Lands lest I should be thought to take any advantage from my Authority in the Office and to give my self the preference before Others.”\footnote{Logan to James Steel, n.d. Contents put it after 1732. Land Office Transcripts, Bk. D-113, p. 298.}

But we must not become diverted from the main point. Logan’s manipulations were calculated to enhance his Indian trade and coordinate his land speculations with the trade. It is sufficient here to remark that the Conestoga land episode was typical of, rather than exceptional to Logan’s handling of his traders’ business sites. The same sort of experience that had befallen John Cartlidge and Andrew Cornish was also to happen to Logan’s old standbys, Martin Chartier and James Le Tort, as well as to such new men as Jonas Davenport and Abraham Penington. Only Peter Bizaillon stands out as a shrewd enough businessman to die with his estate intact and unencumbered.

The effect on the Indians of Logan’s land hunger can hardly be exaggerated. The “fur trade interest” in Pennsylvania, which was pre-eminently James Logan, was not a social and political factor protecting Indians from the encroachments of settling farmers, as has sometimes been alleged was the case in other colonies. Rather, in Pennsylvania the trade was a means of accelerating settlement. Logan the merchant put his traders as close to Indian villages as he could: his store at Conestoga, for example, was next to one Indian village and on the abandoned site of another.\footnote{David H. Landis, “The Location of Pequahan,” Lancaster Co. Hist. Soc. Publications 23 (1919) : pp. 69-77.} Through the trade Logan amassed the capital and resources to become a magnate of lands. In effect, the Indians performed pioneer labor for him, clearing wilderness sites—which he later acquired—for their villages, and establishing lines of communication and transportation. But a dilemma arose. Since the value of lands rose directly in proportion to the number of Europeans in their vicinity, Logan’s lands would become spectacularly more valuable only if they became surrounded with masses of people so great that continued residence by Indians would become difficult or impossible. Thus there was conflict inherent in the motivations of Logan’s different functions. As merchant he wanted to keep as many Indian customers and suppliers as possible, as long as possible; but in the long run the interest of Logan the land speculator required Logan the merchant to transform the character of the land. His genius is revealed in the devices by which he reconciled his varied motivations to consistent advantage. The effect of his activities on the Indians was first to draw them to the Susquehanna region in pursuit of trade, then to push them ever farther to the west, destroying the sedentary agricultural aspects of their economy and magnifying the importance of hunting and nomadism. Certainly, settlement by whites would have taken place anyway—Logan cannot be held responsible for that—but the advance of settlement...
was profoundly influenced by Logan. To a considerable extent, he controlled the direction of the advance; and, both as merchant and as provincial officer, he controlled the Indians also.

When white settlers began to surge into the Susquehanna valley they did not escape law or authority. Rather, they moved into territory where Logan’s agents were omnipresent, informed, and effective. This frontier, within the limits that mattered to Logan, could be and was disciplined. His final control of controls was the hunger of the settlers for good title to their lands, a hunger that could be satiated only by the Commissioners of Property dominated by Logan. The land available for settlement was limited in quantity by reasons of topography, law, and diplomacy. The upper reaches of the Susquehanna River, as well as its farther side, were in Indian territory; every settler there would have over his property the encumbrance of Indian claims, and over his head the hazard of Indian resentment. The lower reaches of the river were spoiled for stable and knowledgeable farmers by the uncertainty over land titles in the large area disputed between Pennsylvania and Maryland. Penniless immigrants went there and squatted, but those who could pay good money went where the Land Office would sell. Among the purchasers, three distinct large groups can be identified and traced: the Mennonites who settled at Strasburg in 1710; the Palatines who came in 1717; and the Scotch-Irish who settled the Donegal-Hempfield region, beginning in 1718.

In 1710 a number of Swiss Mennonites bought 10,000 acres from the Commissioners of Property and pushed up into the “back parts” of what was then still Chester County. Going over the low divide that separates the Delaware watershed from the Susquehanna, they laid out their settlement of Strasburg in 1710; the Palatines who came in 1717; and the Scotch-Irish who settled the Donegal-Hempfield region, beginning in 1718.

During this period, Logan made basic preparations for the next large-scale settlement. Among other things, he ordered three sizable tracts of land at Pequea Creek and French Creek secretly laid out for himself, taking some pains to disguise his personal involvement. In 1717 a new group of refugees, this time largely from the Palatinate, arrived in Pennsylvania and obtained warrants from the Commissioners of Property for lands to be taken up in many parcels about Conestoga and Pequea creeks. Logan negotiated these sales personally, and the consequences indicate that he arrived at a personally satisfactory arrangement with the settlers. Many of the Palatines’ tracts were surveyed within the newly established Conestoga Manor. As this fact was elaborately concealed from the Proprietaries, it seems likely that the money for their lands was also kept beyond their reach. The evidence of concealment is inconclusive.

testable: a flat statement was made by Logan's associate in the Land Office, James Steel, fourteen years after the event, that "only 300" acres of the Manor had been sold, "which was Granted to a very useful person about the Indians and their affairs." Steel knew better; he was one of Logan's closest cronies in land dealings; but the deception was kept up until young Thomas Penn came to the province in 1732 to see for himself what had been disposed of and what had not.

North of the Germans there still remained some open territory, occupied only by Indians who had retreated upriver from the Germans; and, of course, also by traders. In this area, later organized as Hempfield and Donegal townships, Logan made certain arrangements. In addition to the usual tracts provided for his traders, he had made certain arrangements. In addition to the usual tracts provided for his traders, he had more surveys made for himself. Logan's trader, Peter Bizaillon had established a road or trail through the area from the settled regions to his trading post at Paxtang and some land was surveyed for the Proprietaries near the road, at Shickasalongo (Chickies) Creek, in 1719. Apparently reports were favorable. Logan bought a thousand acres, "designing to make a Settlement there." He had another 1,400 acres surveyed for himself in June, 1720, without bothering about the formality of payment until four years later; then, in 1724, he secured title through a grant from Hannah Penn when she badly needed his help in the Penns' family fight over their inheritance. Logan later affirmed that he directed a stream of Scotch-Irish settlers to the area, but in explaining the matter to John Penn he failed to mention his lands. In a much-quoted passage Logan rationalized the settlement of Donegal on the grounds that "those People might prove a considerable Security" against possible Indian hostilities. In fact, the bellicosity of the Scotch-Irish was to prove more of a source of hostilities with Indians than a defense against them, but the presence of "those people" did very nicely create a considerable security for the values of Logan's lands. The earliest settler of record in the vicinity arrived in 1718, and there were already enough neighbors in 1719 or early 1720 to organize Donegal Presbyterian Church. All were acknowledgedly dependent on Logan and Logan's promises that "we should have the first refusal of purchasing the Lands we have made improvements on."

Even so clever a man as Logan, however, could not keep the Indians contented while white settlers occupied the land. The Mennonite immigration of 1718 flowed into Conestoga Manor, and Surveyor Taylor's maps show that Logan allocated lands right up to the Indian village. In the midst of settlement some anonymous cynic, drunk, or prophet—an Englishman resident near Conestoga—told the Indians that the King of Great Britain and the Regent of France had agreed to "cut off" the Indians of North America to make room for surplus Europeans. The rumor flew along the river. By June the Five Nations chiefs had heard it three times and were confronting New York's Governor with it. They told him that they did not really believe it, but if there should be anything to it they would not allow themselves to be pushed over easily; and they betrayed the uneasiness beneath their bravado by their angry insistence that they would find out who was sending smallpox among them, and seek to "disswade" that evil person "from such pernicious practices."

"Invaders" from Maryland increased tension. The Provincial Council resolved that their friends, the Indians in the Conestoga neighborhood, must have been very much disturbed by the settlers from Maryland "near the thickest of our settlements."

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79 Cf. names on draft of survey with those on list of dates. Draft: Cadwalader Collection (cited, n. 58). List: Taylor's Account of Lands, "Lands on Conestoga Creek and the Mill Creek."

A warrant to survey 500 acres "within the Township or Boundaries of Conestoga" was issued by the Commissioners of Property, 25 July, 1717, for Logan's friend Jeremiah Langhorne. Langhorne covered it with Original Rights he bought in October, 1718. Deed, Jeremiah Langhorne to Robert Barber, 20 Aug., 1726, Lancaster County Deed Book, FF, p. 362.


Steel's denial: James Steel to John Penn, 12 Nov., 1731, James Steel's Letter Book, 1730-1741, p. 37, HSP.


80 See Brackbill (cited, n. 75).

81 Logan to John Penn, 18 Oct., 1728, Penn Mss., Official Correspondence, 2: p. 33.


While Logan continued to encourage settlers who bought their land under Pennsylvania law, the Council magnificently commissioned Colonel John French as Ranger and Keeper of the Marches of the Province, and authorized him to apprehend the Marylanders.85

In January, 1718, the Commissioners of Property decided that

The late Settlements on and near Conestogo Creek hath made it necessary that the Indian fields about the Town should be enclosed by a good fence to secure the Indians Corn from the Horses, Cattle and Hogs of those new settlers that would otherwise destroy it and thereby cause an uneasiness in those Indians.86

At the same meeting the Commissioners granted a warrant to Peter Chartier to buy the 300 acres on which his father Martin had located and was currently operating a trading post. It would appear that this action was also intended to placate the Indians, for Martin Chartier had lived among the Shawnees since their entry into Pennsylvania, and Peter was his son by a Shawnee wife. But Martin died in April, and, according to Logan's accounts, Chartier owed the sum of £108.19.33. It was not an especially large sum, compared to other traders' accounts; indeed, there were movable goods on the premises sufficient to discharge the debt more than three times over. But Logan, as "principal creditor," not only informed young Peter Chartier that the son was accountable for his father's debts, but also seized all of Martin Chartier's real property as well as personal. Logan extracted a deed from Peter for his recently acquired 300-acre tract with improvements (which appears not to have been paid for up to that time). Then Logan evicted Peter and established another trader, Stephen Atkinson, in his place. The ethics of the transaction would be questionable even by white men's standards. Among other things, Logan's haste to get Chartier's debt discharged was not matched by any dispatch in paying his own; though Stephen Atkinson paid Logan £30 for the Charter tract in 1720, Logan did not pass the money along to the Proprietaries until 1727.87

If whites may cavil at the seizure of Chartier's homestead, the Shawnees must have been outraged. How could the eviction of one of their chief men be reconciled with William Penn's solemn encouragement to live among the Christians?

Even the sharply edited official records betray the Indians' dismay. When the Susquehanna Indians called at Philadelphia in June of 1718, they had only sweet words of friendship and regard according to the treaty minutes. But, though the editor of the minutes removed from the Indians' expressions all reference to land, he permitted Governor William Keith, on the following day and page, to answer the question that ostensibly had never been asked. Suddenly we find ourselves aware of a dialogue that had been in progress for some time. Keith reminded the Indians "That in Referrance to the Surveys of Lands, they Cannot but be sensible of the Care that has been taken of them. They had Expressed a willingness to Retire from Conestogoe; Yet the Government here had persuade[d] them to Continue near us." Keith pointed out how the Indians' fields at Conestoga had been fenced off for them; but, instead of satisfying the Indians, this reminder merely stimulated them to ask that the Shawnee and Conoy villages should be fenced too, "with Lines at the distance of four miles from the River."88

Logan somehow managed to temporize. Ever fertile in expedients, he permitted Peter Chartier to trade on credit from the Conestoga store. Eventually Chartier was able to establish a new trading post higher up the Susquehanna at Paxtang. But references to Chartier in Logan's business correspondence hint at an antagonism that never really ended. Though the time was yet decades off before any serious outbreak of violence by the Shawnees against Pennsylvanians, it was Peter Chartier's band that first turned hostile, in 1745, ten years before the French and Indian War.89

Logan's seizure of Chartier's homestead cannot, of course, be held the direct cause of an event so remote in time; nevertheless, in an accumulation of grievances a man would remember being deprived of his patrimony, and Indian memories were long. The trade which had drawn to Pennsylvania the Shawnee band of Martin Chartier evolved in such a way that it helped to drive them out again with his son Peter.

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85 Council, 15 Feb., 1718, 3: p. 27.
89 Deposition of Peter Tostee, James Dinnen, and George Croghan, 14 May, 1745, Peters Mss. 2: p. 32.
Immigrants continued to come. Their livestock got into the Indians' unfenced crops, and the resentful Indians were cowed by the greater numbers, wealth, and power of the intruders. Even so, the Susquehanna River continued to be the limit line for white settlers until 1732, and Logan's organization dominated the region's affairs almost absolutely. When the next great surge of immigration took settlers over the river, they passed over trails beaten by Logan's traders through towns built on Logan's lands. If they encountered the law, it was in courts manned by justices who had been appointed by Governors but chosen by Logan. And when at last they drove their Conestoga wagons onto Logan's ferry they were carried to the other side of the river where once again they found his traders' trails, leading to an empire.

The frontier period in the Susquehanna valley deviated so sharply from the hypotheses of frontier theory as to require major modification or invalidation of that theory. Nothing in the history of the Susquehanna frontier suggests that it was a source of democracy, not even if the customary unspoken assumption is made that democracy is a process in which Indians don't count. Indeed the opposite seems true. Indian dependency on the fur trade managed by Logan, as well as white settlers' dependency on the land titles to be secured from Logan, contributed to authoritarianism rather than libertarianism in the region. The whites of the longer-settled eastern region, like the Indians of the wilderness beyond the frontier, were more free in speech and action than the people of both races who lived within the frontier zone.